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Breland v. Schilling: Louisiana's Approach to "Injuries
Expected or Intended From the Standpoint of the
Insured"
Ronald "Bug" Schilling lay on the ground after sliding head first
into third base in an unsuccessful attempt to knock the softball out of
the third baseman's glove. The third baseman, William Breland, looked
down at Schilling and released the ball, which struck Schilling on the
chin. Angered, Schilling rose to his feet and punched Breland in the
jaw, breaking it in two places. Breland subsequently filed a lawsuit
against Schilling, who then brought a third party action against his
homeowner's insurer, Southern Farm Bureau. Thus the court was con-
fronted with the question of whether the injuries inflicted by Schilling
fell within the standard exclusion from liability coverage in his hom-
eowner's policy for "injuries expected or intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Obviously, Schilling intended for Breland to suffer
some injury; however, Schilling argued that the broken jaw was not
intended.
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the approach
the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted in Breland v. Schilling' to de-
termine the applicability of the exclusion 2 when the insured undeniably
intended some type of injury but argues that the injury which actually
resulted was not intended. This article will also compare the court's
analysis with that which has been used in two areas involving similar
intent inquiries: personal insurance and workers' compensation. To better
facilitate this comparison, an overview of the current jurisprudence in
those two areas is included. The article concludes with suggested mod-
ifications of the provision's wording which might better serve the purpose
of the exclusion.
I. BRELAND v. SCHILLINo
In determining whether to afford Breland the protection of liability
insurance, the supreme court was confronted with several legal issues
and public policy considerations. This portion of the article will discuss
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 1989).
2. Unless otherwise stated, the generic terms "the exclusion" or "the provision"
refer to the wording of the standard exclusion from liability coverage in homeowner's
policies such as that found in Breland. The exclusion precludes liability coverage for
"injuries expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."
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the public policy considerations behind the "intentional injury" exclusion
and will include a brief overview of earlier Louisiana jurisprudence
interpreting and applying the provision to help emphasize the issues
faced by the Breland court. The court's approach and resolution of the
issues will next be discussed, followed by an analysis of the reasoning
employed by the court. The section then concludes with a survey of
approaches used by other jurisdictions.
The intentional injury exclusion found in Schilling's homeowner's
policy contained language which was common to many homeowner's
policies. The exclusion provided that the policy did not apply to "bodily
injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from
the standpoint of the Insured." Both business and public policy con-
siderations necessitate this intentional injury exclusion.
From a business standpoint, the insurer agrees to compensate the
insured in the event of the occurrence of an uncertain loss. The premiums
charged are based on actuarial calculations of the random occurrence
or risk of such events occurring in a given population. This central
concept of insurance is violated if a single insured is allowed, through
intentional or reckless acts, to consciously control risks which are covered
by the policy.'
Public policy prohibits contracting for indemnification of losses re-
sulting from one's own willful wrongdoing, as transferring financial
.responsibility serves to decrease the deterrence of these acts.4 As one
court explained it, "the provision is designed to prevent an insured from
acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance com-
pany will 'pay the piper' for the damages." ' A competing public policy
holds that liability insurance exists not only for the protection of the
insured but also to provide the victim with an adequate source of funds
to redress his damages.6
But the public policies supporting the exclusion take precedence over
concern for the victim's receiving proper compensation by way of the
aggressor's liability insurance. Through an intentional act, the insured
consciously controls the risk and should not be indemnified for losses
resulting from his liability for such an act. However, the principles
behind the provision do not dictate the outcome so clearly when the
insured acts with an intent to cause some injury, but injury of a much
3. 7 A. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4492.01 (Berdal ed. 1979). See
also Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy
Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957, 976
(1984).
4. See Transamerica ins. Group v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351, 694 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1984).
5. Id. at 356, 694 P.2d at 186.
6. Louisiana has statutorily recognized this public policy in La. R.S. 22:655.D (1978
and Supp. 1991).
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greater magnitude results. When the injury received is much greater than
that intended, the insured has not completely controlled the risk covered
by the policy. Before Breland, the Louisiana courts used various ap-
proaches to resolve the coverage issue when the insured acted with an
intent to cause some injury or contact but claimed that the resulting
injury was not intended.
In Kipp v. Hurdle,7 the first circuit adopted a presumption that the
actor intended the consequences of her aggressive action. However, the
more severe the resulting injuries are, the more aggressive the act must
be to support the presumption.' The third circuit, however, criticized
and refused to adopt this presumption in Rambin v. Wood,9 citing the
traditional Restatement definition of intent, which states that a resulting
injury is intended when "the actor desires to cause the consequences of
his act, or . . . he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it."'
Some of the earlier cases avoided the issue altogether by concluding
that the actor/insured did not intend any harm or injury, even when
the facts clearly indicated otherwise. Borque v. Duplechin" is an excellent
example. The plaintiff, Borque, who weighed 140 pounds, was severely
injured in a softball game when the defendant Duplechin, who weighed
210 pounds, ran into him five feet outside the baseline. While running
full speed, Duplechin "brought his left arm up under Borque's chin,"' 2
which resulted in the injury. The court of appeal affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the defendant's actions were negligent and did
not include an intent to harm, apparently employing the rationale that
Duplechin's intent was merely to break up a double play. 3 The more
rational explanation for Duplechin's acts would seem to be that, although
his motive was to break up a double play,' 4 he intended to cause Borque
at least some harm.
7. 307 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 310 So. 2d 643 (1975).
8. See Kling v. Collins, 407 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (where push from
insured caused plaintiff to trip and suffer a wrist injury, the first circuit found the
insured's actions were not "so aggressive" as to support the presumption).
9. 355 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
10. Id. at 563. See also Sherwood v. Sepulvado, 362 So. 2d 1161, 1163 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1978) ("When the act is intentional, but the injury is not, the exclusionary clause
is not applicable.").
11. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 334 So. 2d 210 (1976).
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id. at 43.
14. Id. at 42. See also Schexnider v. McGuill, 526 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 532 So. 2d 116 (1988) (Insured indicated to the barmaid that he was about
to teach plaintiff, Schexnider, a lesson and punched him in the face, causing several
broken bones in Schexnider's face. The third circuit held insured "acted reflexively and
without a conscious or deliberate intent to strike a blow and without a belief that his
uncontrolled action would cause injury." 526 So. 2d at 516.).
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The supreme court addressed the application and interpretation of
the exclusion in Pique v. Saia,s but the court missed the opportunity
to hand down a clear guideline for applying the provision. A scuffle
ensued when two police officers, Pique and Rhodes, attempted to arrest
the defendant, Charles Saia, Jr. At some point in the altercation, Saia
was pushed against a fence, causing the trio to fall onto a concrete
driveway. The scuffle continued on the ground until Saia was eventually
handcuffed. Pique suffered an elbow injury in the fall.
The court initially determined that, because of ambiguity in the
exclusion,, it should be construed as excluding only intentional and not
"expected" injuries, stating the proper inquiry as follows:
An injury is intentional, i.e. the product of an intentional act,
only when the person who acts either consciously desires the
physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result
happening from his conduct; or knows that the result is sub-
stantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire
may be as to the result. 16
However, the court found that the trial court was not manifestly
erroneous in its determination that-the plaintiff's injury resulted from
a negligent act by Saia. The court concluded that it could not declare
the trial court unreasonable for finding that Saia's act of pushing away
from the fence was performed with a complete absence of intent to do
any harm or injury."
This enunciated rule provided no clear guideline. One could very
easily conclude that the court, by including the language "i.e., the
product of an intentional act" in the analysis and finding negligence,
had adopted the position that the intentional tort doctrine should de-
termine the extent of the policy exclusion, i.e., the injury need only
result from an intentional tort for the exclusion to be applicable. Such
an interpretation of Pique was likely given the close association of
"intentional act" and "intentional tort" which resulted from jurispru-
dence in the field of worker's compensation law.
The court could have clarified the issue by concluding the obvious-
Saia did intend harmful or offensive contact. Saia was engaged in a
fight and was "kicking and flailing his arms about,"'" obviously in-
tending several harmful or offensive contacts. It is unlikely that this
intent suddenly deserted him when he was pushed against the fence.
The court then could have approached the issue of Saia's liability in-
surance coverage by affirming the trial court's determination that the
15. 450 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984).
16. Id. at 655.
17. Id. at 656.
18. Id. at 657 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
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extensive injury to Pique's elbow was not intentional, i.e., not the result
of an act intended to cause such an injury. In doing so, the court could
have developed the same rule that would later be developed in Breland.
Breland presented facts to the Louisiana courts which required them
to determine the scope of the exclusion. At the trial stage, the jury
determined that the injury to Breland was not intended and therefore
that the exclusion was not applicable. In an unpublished opinion, the
first circuit affirmed this determination.' 9 The supreme court granted
writs and approached the issue in a two step process. First, the court
set out to decide what inquiry was proper in determining what injury
the actor intended. Secondly, a rule had to be adopted for determining
whether the injury which actually resulted from the action would fall
within the exclusion, thus barring coverage.
The supreme court began its analysis by first repeating the earlier
Pique holding that the clause was ambiguous and therefore should be
construed against the insurer. The ambiguity should be resolved, ac-
cording to the court, by ascertaining how a reasonable insurance policy
purchaser would construe the clause at the time of the entering into of
the insurance contract. The court observed that the policy language
referred to injury intended "from the standpoint of the Insured," and
stated, "[t]he subjective intention and expectation of the insured deter-
mine which injuries fall within and which fall beyond the scope of
coverage under this policy.'"'1
In articulating the proper inquiry to be used in determining an
actor's subjective intent, the court began by first stating what inquiries
were not appropriate. The intentional tort standard was rejected because
it used an objective inquiry which contrasted sharply with the subjective.
intent required by the exclusion. Similarly, the inquiry used in the
worker's compensation "intentional act" exception to the exclusive rem-
edy rule was rejected because the exception applied to injuries produced
by an employer or co-employee's intentional act, rather than injuries
intended by the actor.2' The court additionally reasoned that worker's
compensation uses a tort-based standard for determining intent that
exposes the actor to liability for injuries not in fact intended.2" The
court also rejected the Kipp presumption that an insured intends, as a
matter of law, all. injuries which flow from an intentional act.13
The proper inquiry was determined by reference to definitions of
intent adopted by other jurisdictions which also look to the "subjective"
19. Breland v. Schilling, 542 So. 2d 1177 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
20. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 611 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 611.
22. Id. at 612.
23. Id. at 613.
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intentions of the insured. One such rule stated, "the exclusion refers
only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted to be
a result . . . or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain .... ,,24
Another read: "[ain insured intends an injury if he desired to cause
the consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such consequences
were substantially certain to result.''2
Having delineated the appropriate inquiry for intent, the supreme
court then looked to the applicability of the provision in instances where
some injury but perhaps not the resulting injury was intended. It con-
cluded that the proper interpretation should be the one which a rea-
sonable layman would give the provision, stating the rule as follows:
[Wihen minor bodily injury is intended, and such results, the
injury is barred from coverage. When serious bodily injury is
intended, and such results, the injury is also barred from cov-
erage. When a severe injury of a given sort is intended, and a
severe injury of any sort occurs, then coverage is also barred.
But when a minor injury is intended, and a substantially greater
or more severe injury results ... coverage for the more severe
injury is not barred.26
The rule was justified by the rationale that "an insurance purchaser
would .. . reasonably conclude that the fortuitous occurrence of more
serious injuries . . .would fall within the range of risks .. . insured."',
A brief summary of the approach adopted by the court is warranted.
The approach is a two step process which requires one to first determine
what injury the actor intended. This task is accomplished by utilizing
a fact-sensitive test of looking to the insured's subjective intent, i.e.,
what he subjectively wanted or foresaw as practically certain to result.
The second step involves comparing the injury intended (determined in
step one) to the injury which actually resulted. If a reasonable insurance
purchaser would believe that the resulting injury would be covered by
his liability insurance, then the injury is "substantially greater or more
severe and coverage is not barred." 8
In applying this approach to the facts of the case, the court looked
to the testimony of the defendant Schilling to determine what injury
was subjectively intended. Schilling testified that he did not intend to
24. Id. at 612, citing Patrons-Oxford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 892
(Me. 1981).
25. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 613 (La. 1989).
26. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 613.
28. Id. at 614. The court never expressly declared its approach to be this two step
process, however, upon reading the opinion as a whole, this synopsis is this author's
evaluation of the court's analysis.
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break Breland's jaw or do him any other serious harm. He considered
it a freak accident and said that if he hit another ten people, he did
not think he could break another jaw.29 Based on this testimony, the
supreme court found that the lower courts were correct in concluding
that Schilling did not intend to break Breland's jaw or inflict any other
serious injury, impliedly stating that Breland's intent was to "bruise
... jaw and ego.''30 Given this conclusion, a reasonable layman would
interpret the exclusion as not precluding coverage for the more severe
resulting injury, a broken jaw. Therefore, the intentional injury exclusion
was not applicable and coverage was afforded.
The court based its decision on several fundamentally sound ana-
lytical techniques, such as examining how a reasonable insurance pur-
chaser would construe the exclusion language. However, some statements
made by the court in its reasoning can be questioned, as can the court's
application of its rule to the facts presented in Breland. An analysis of
the opinion will better elucidate these points.
II. ANALYSIS
The Breland rule, which allows for coverage for resulting injuries
of a much greater magnitude than those intended, is fundamentally
sound from both a public policy and a contractual standpoint. Because
the resulting injury was fortuitously more severe, the insured did not
consciously control the risk against which he insured himself. Although
indemnity may diminish the deterrence of these acts to an extent, this
decrease is not sufficient to justify depriving the victim of an adequate
source of funds with which to redress his injuries. An insurance policy
is a contract. As such, the rules of contract interpretation should apply,
and a reasonable insurance purchaser would not believe that a resulting
injury of a much more severe magnitude than he intended would be
excluded from his liability coverage.
However, three aspects of the opinion are questionable. First, in
dicta the supreme court makes the statement that intentional tort uses
an objective standard for determining intent. Secondly, the court's ap-
proach in determining the actor's subjective intent appears to place
undue emphasis on the insured's testimony. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the court's application of its rule to the facts of Breland is by
far the most narrow construction ever given to the exclusion. Such an
application of the rule may conflict with both public policy and con-
tractual interpretation concerns.
29. Id. at 614.
30. Id. at 613.
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A. The "Intentional Tort" Dicta
In an effort to properly characterize the "subjective intent" required
by the policy exclusion, the supreme court stated that this subjective
intent contrasted sharply with the objective inquiry used in intentional
tort analysis. In the court's words, "the inquiry regarding intentional
torts asks which consequences an objective reasonable person might
expect or intend .. ."I' This dicta is significant for two reasons.
1. Rejection of the Restatement View?
First, based on statements preceding the dicta, the court may have
rejected the traditional Restatement definition of intent. The court made
the statement f6llowing a citation of the Restatement's "substantially
certain" definition of intent, i.e. one intends consequences which he
knows are substantially certain to result from an act, whether the actor
consciously desires those consequences or not.32 The court apparently
concluded that because this definition only requires that the actor "know
to a substantial certainty" that the results will occur rather than "con-
sciously desire" those results, it employs an objective or reasonable man
standard." By determining that the intentional tort "substantially cer-
tain" definition offers an alternate objective determination for intent,
the court eliminated this alternative from the definition of intent found
in the exclusion, as that intent must be "subjective." In other words,
the exclusion will be applicable only if the insured consciously desires
the injury. Admittedly, the interpretation of the exclusion involves con-
tractual issues and different public policies, so the principles of tort law
aie not completely analogous or applicable. However, four considerations
lead to the conclusion that the "substantially certain" definition of
intent should be applicable to the exclusion.
First, to conclude that the "substantially certain" definition is in-
appropriate for the insurance exclusion clause would lead to results
which are obviously contrary to public policy. The following rather
extreme example using Prosser's "bomb in the carriage" scenario illus-
trates this point. Adam consciously desires to kill his brother, Bob,
although he harbors no ill will toward his sister, Susan. Adam places
explosives in Bob's car sufficient to scatter it and its occupants over
five blocks. Adam watches as both Bob and Susan get in the car and,
full of hate for Bob and sorrow for Susan, he detonates the explosives.
31. Id. at 611.
32. Id. at 611, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965).
33. This observation is based on the court's inclusion of the phrase "substantially
certain" in quotation marks, prior to its statement that intentional tort uses an objective
standard. 550 So. 2d at 611.
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In this example, by omitting the "substantially certain" definition of
intent from the insurance exclusion clause, the injuries or death to Susan
would not be considered "intended by the insured," as Adam did not
consciously desire to injure Susan. Therefore, Adam's liability insurance
would provide coverage for any liability to Susan or her beneficiaries.
To allow coverage in such an instance would completely circumvent the
basis for insurance, as the insured has consciously controlled the risk
against which he is insured. In addition, recovery under these facts
would allow contractual indemnification against loss resulting from one's
own willful wrongdoing.
Secondly, support for the inclusion of this definition of intent comes
from the common usage and definition of the word "intend." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary defines "intend" as "to have in
mind as an object to be gained or achieved.'"' This definition does not
require one to consciously desire, but only to "have in mind as an
object." One definition given of "object" is: "something that is set
... before the mind so as to be apprehended or known."" This requir es
that the end be only known, not necessarily consciously desired.
The most obvious support for the incorporation of the "substantially
certain" definition of intent in the exclusion comes from the cited
definitions of "subjective intent" used by other jurisdictions which also
adhere to a subjective approach. Of the three definitions cited by the
Breland court, two incorporate a similar, if not identical, "substantially
certain" criterion. 36
Finally, the court's conclusion that the intentional tort "substantially
certain" definition of intent incorporates an inappropriate objective in-
quiry is, at least historically, incorrect. The court stated in dicta, "the
inquiry regarding intentional torts asks which consequences an objective
reasonable person might expect or intend. ... "i' In Fallo v. Tuboscope
Inspection," this same court just five years earlier rejected this conclusion
and called such reasoning "clear error."" Surely the Breland court's
statement was the result of an oversight, as it conflicts with the primary
component of intentional tort: that a certain state of mind exists in the
actor.4o
34. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1175 (1986).
35. Id. at 1555 (emphasis added).
36. Inquiries into the "subjective intent" included some of the following language:
"or substantially foresaw as practically certain" and "knowing ... substantially certain."
Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 612-13 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 611.
38. 444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
39. Id. at 622.
40. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 8 (5th ed. 1984).
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Prosser's Law of Torts4' was cited by the court and offers a possible
explanation for the Breland court's misstatement. Following the passage
giving the substantially certain definition, Prosser makes the statement
that "[tihe practical application of this principle has meant that where
a reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with
... as though he had intended it.' 42 But as explained in Prosser and
Keeton's fifth edition,' 3 this reference to a reasonable man's belief is
simply a method or tool to be utilized as an aid in determining the
ultimate criterion: the actor's "state of mind."" Prosser and Keeton
recognized this misunderstanding as a "source of great confusion."' 45
The reasonable man standard is used simply as a means of evaluating
an actor's self-serving testimony and allows the jury to infer from the
circumstances what the actor's actual intent was. This objective inquiry
is not an end to the intent issue in intentional tort but is merely an
accurate means for determining what the actor (not the reasonable man)
intended.
2. Contradictions in Worker's Compensation Cases
The second significant aspect of the dicta is that it contradicts
established jurisprudence in the worker's compensation field which ex-
plicitly rejects an objective approach for determining an alleged tort-
feasor's intent. The court's statement that intentional tort asks what
consequences a reasonable man would have intended must appear as a
diamond in the rough for attorneys pursuing executive officer suits. The
effect would be to greatly lessen the burden of proof, as one would
need only to prove that a reasonable man (as opposed to the actor in
the particular case at hand) would have known to a substantial certainty
that the result would occur. Evidence supporting the actor's actual
intentions would be irrelevant, as the sole issue would be what a rea-
sonable man would have intended. Thus the reasonable man or objective
inquiry is converted from a means to an end, which traditionally has
been the foundation for an action in negligence."
In summary, in discussing the contrasting example of intentional
tort's "objective intent," the court may possibly have rejected the Res-
tatement's intentional tort's "substantially certain" definition of "in-
tend" for purposes of the insurance exclusion and, through dictum, may
41. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 8 (41h ed. 1971).
42. Id. at 32.
43. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, supra note 40, at 34-36.
44. Id. at 36.
45. Id. at 35.
46. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
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have opened the door for objective intent determinations in intentional
tort.
B. The Role of the Insured's Testimony in Determining Subjective
Intent
The second aspect of the court's opinion warranting discussion is
the method used to discover the actor's "subjective intent." The method
of inferring intent was surprisingly absent from the majority opinion,
as the court resorted exclusively to the defendant's testimony. Only
Justice Lemmon, stating "It]he insured's subjective intent ... must be
determined not only from the insured's words ... but from all the
facts and circumstances . . .,"'4 recognized in his concurring opinion the
inference of intent as a valid approach. The majority relied solely on
the testimony of the defendant, who stated that he did not intend to
break the plaintiff's jaw and considered it a "freak accident."'"
Perhaps the court's reliance solely upon the insured's testimony was
the result of its rationale that intent is so "subjective" that only the
actor's testimony can accurately reveal it. One would hope that the
court's action of resorting to the defendant's testimony to determine
intent was because no contrary intent was offered by the circumstances
or the facts. 49 Otherwise, as stated by the insurer in its brief on ap-
plication for rehearing:
One wonders how many such feasors, when faced with financial
accounting for their brutality, are likely to take the stand, growl
at the judge and jury, and allow as how they intended to do
just what they did, namely, bash in the victim's face.5 0
An additional explanation for the court's reliance on the actor's
testimony alone is that possibly the court was simply applying the
substantial evidence rule. The insured's testimony is not dispositive proof
of his subjective intent but, in this instance, was merely sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict. In the subsequent case of Baugh v.
Redmond," however, the second circuit failed to interpret Breland as
such when faced with nearly identical facts. In this case, the substantial
evidence rule favored the insurer because the trial court had concluded,
47. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 615 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 614. Justice Lemmon indicated this belief in his concurrence. However,
neither the majority opinion nor Justice Lemmon's concurrence recognized the inference
of this intent from the insured's actions.
49. Id. at 614.
50. Applicant's Brief for Rehearing at 3, Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609 (La.
1989).
51. 565 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
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as a finding of fact, that the insured had intended the injury, thus
precluding coverage.
The insured was engaged in a softball game and punched the umpire,
causing extensive damage to the umpire's teeth and the bones in his
mouth. Despite evidence in the record that the force of the blow was
so strong that it popped the lens out of the umpire's glasses and knocked
him against a fence, 2 the second circuit reversed the trial court primarily
because of the insured's testimony. That testimony indicated that he did
not think he struck the plaintiff with enough force to inflict a bloody
mouth and, further, that he did not intend for the plaintiff to be
injured. 3 The court made this conclusion after citing the Breland rule.
The decisions by the supreme court in Breland and by the second
circuit in Baugh attribute excessive weight to the insured's testimony
and indicate a possibly exaggerated confidence in the power of the oath.
In summary, by placing undue emphasis on the insured's testimony, the
court has limited the factfinder's ability to infer intent. s4
C. The Court's Application of Its Rule to the Facts
The aspect of the Breland opinion most deserving of discussion is
the court's application of its rule to the facts presented, an application
which resulted in a strict construction of the exclusion unequaled in
other jurisdictions. The logic of the rule adopted by the court is clear
and consistent. The insurance agreement is a contract." Because the
exclusion is ambiguous, the issue of whether coverage should be permitted
should be resolved by construing the exclusion as a reasonable insurance
purchaser would.
To use the example in footnote 8 of the Breland opinion, if an
insured slaps another (intending minor injury) and a coma results (serious
injury), the exclusion should not be applicable, as this outcome would
certainly not be considered by a reasonable layman as an injury which
would be excluded under the provision.
The problem arises, however, in the court's application of its rule.
When one young man slams his fist into another's face, is the resulting
broken jaw really a "freak accident" or so "fortuitous" so as to be
classified as "substantially . . . more severe" than the injury intended?
The question of whether an injury is "substantially .. .more severe"
than that intended is clear in cases where a single punch results in
52. Id. at 956.
53. Id. at 961.
54. See also S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 260, in 15
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (Supp. 1991) (questioning Breland court's possible recognition
of "I didn't mean to do it" defense).
55. La. R.S. 22:5(I)(a) (Supp. 1991).
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paralysis, coma, blindness, or even death; but is it so clear when the
result is a broken jaw, shattered teeth, or a broken nose? Prior to the
accident, would Schilling really have believed that the exclusion would
not be applicable if he punched somebody in the face and broke his
jaw?
This dilemma arises because the actual injury intended (step one of
the approach) cannot usually be determined as specifically as the court
would hope. When Schilling punched Breland, he intended to "injure"
him. Because punching someone in the face is not an exact science, it
is impossible to determine or try to state the precise injury that Schilling
"subjectively" intended. If Schilling's arm could have been stopped in
mid-swing and the question presented to him of what injury he was
intending, it would have been surprising indeed for him to have astutely
responded, "I intend to bruise both jaw and ego;" equally as surprisingly
would have been the response, "I intend to fracture the jaw bone in
two places, ultimately requiring the mouth to be wired shut for twelve
weeks." More likely would have been the response, "I am going to
bust him in the face." His intent was simply to "injure" and cannot
accurately be drawn more narrowly. He engaged in an act which can
produce any number of injuries in a given range. Injuries which occur
outside of this range, such as paralysis, coma, blindness, or death,
should be excluded. However, a broken jaw should fall within this
range. A reasonable insurance purchaser would, in all likelihood, believe
that if he punched someone in the face and broke his jaw or nose that
the intentional injury exclusion would preclude coverage for the resulting
liability.
The more logical application would have been as follows: Schilling
subjectively intended to cause injury or harm to Breland's face. It is
impractical and inaccurate to attempt to draw his intent more narrowly.
Furthermore, a reasonable insurance purchaser would not expect that a
broken jaw resulting from the act of striking another in the face would
fall within the exclusion, and therefore coverage would be precluded.
The extent of the strict construction of the exclusion given by the court
is addressed later in this article when the applications of similar rules
by other jurisdictions are discussed.
D. Synopsis
In summary, then, the Breland opinion is somewhat difficult to
analyze because it requires the reader to infer in many instances what
measures are being taken by the court. For example, the question of
whether the court rejected the intentional tort "substantially certain"
definition of intent for the exclusion at issue is not specifically answered
in the opinion. The court based its possible rejection on the belief that
this criterion incorporates an inappropriate objective inquiry. Rejection
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of this definition is not warranted by public policy or contractual con-
siderations and is based on an inaccurate conclusion that the criterion
incorporates an objective determination. The court's use of intentional
tort inquiry as an example of objective intent is not supported by the
jurisprudence.
In addition, the court's discussion of subjective intent and its sub-
sequent reference to the insured's testimony as proof of that intent raise
serious questions regarding the insurer's burden of proving the insured's
intent. The application of the rule by the court greatly broadens the
horizons of potential insurance coverage for intentional injuries. The
public policy and contractual considerations which firmly support the
rule adopted by the Breland court, and the court's subsequent ques-
tionable application of this rule, can be better understood by comparing
the Breland decision with the approaches used by other jurisdictions.
III. APPROACHES USED By OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Approaches taken by the various jurisdictions range from the most
liberal interpretation of the exclusions, such as that found in California,
where liability coverage is prohibited by statute for any injury resulting
from an act committed with an intent to injure, 6 to more narrow
constructions which require that, for coverage to be barred, the resulting
injury must be of the same general type as that intended.
A review of the jurisprudence from the different states reveals that
three different approaches are commonly used by the courts. One ap-
proach adopts the view that' the exclusion applies if the insured acts
with an intent to do any harm, regardless if the resulting injury is
different in character or magnitude." Thus in Jones v. Norval,"s the
56. Cal. Ins. Code § 533 (West 1972). Florida has recently adopted a similar approach
in Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989), where the court stated that
specific intent to cause harm is not required by the intentional acts exclusion as it excludes
all intentional acts.
57. See Butler v. Behaeghe, 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976); Antill v. State
Farm Cas. Co., 178 Ga. App. 659, 344 S.E.2d 480 (1986); Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions,
100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980) (exclusion read "injury . . . caused ... intentionally"
but was given same basic interpretation); City of Newton v. Krasnigor, 404 Mass. 682,
536 N.E.2d 1078 (1989) (when insured burned box of books in library, liability coverage
not afforded when school suffered over one million dollars in fire damage); Mutual Service
Casualty Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 219 Mont. 304, 711 P.2d 826 (1985); Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1991); Graves v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 745 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Western Nat. Assur. Co. v. Hecker, 43
Wash. App. 816, 719 P.2d 954 (1986); Smith v. Keller, 151 Wis. 2d 264, 444 N.W.2d
396 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (when insured punched victim causing injuries to eye socket
and cheekbone which required surgery, insured was presumed to have intended resulting
harm).
58. 203 Neb. 549, 279 N.W.2d 388 (1979) (applying State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973)).
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exclusion barred coverage when a single punch by the insured knocked
the plaintiff unconscious and broke his jaw. The Nebraska Supreme
Court inferred the necessary intent and rejected contrary testimony by
the insured. However, a case such as Jones does not expose the inequities
and faults of such an approach. Excluding any and all injuries which
might happen to result from an act committed with an intent to cause
any injury ignores both the language of the exclusion and the reasonable
insurance purchaser's interpretation of that language. The shortcomings
of this approach are evidenced by the inequitable results in cases such
as Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co. s9 In this case, the insureds and
the plaintiff were engaged in a "greening pin war." A greening pin is
similar in size and weight to a bobby pin and a "greening pin war"
is comparable to the shooting of paper clips with rubber bands.6 The
plaintiff suffered damage to his cornea after one of the greening pins
struck him in the eye. Although the court found that the insured's
intent was only to "sting" the plaintiff, coverage for the liability resulting
from the plaintiff's cornea injury was barred due to the fact that the
insured had an intent to cause some injury. It was irrelevant that the
actual injury was different in character and magnitude.
Another approach, used in interpreting the exclusion, bars coverage
for injuries which are the natural or probable result of the intentional
act. A case factually similar to Breland which applied this approach is
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Rademacher,61 where the
insured, Rademacher, struck the plaintiff Eberhart in the face, breaking
his jaw. The Michigan Court of Appeals approved the trial court's
conclusion that "when one suffers a broken jaw from being hit on the
jaw, the injury is a natural, probable, foreseeable and expected result"
and coverage was barred.6 This approach has been rejected by other
59. 89 Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979).
60. Id. at 704, 278 N.W.2d at 899.
61. 135 Mich. App. 200, 351 N.W.2d 914 (1984).
62. Id. at 201, 351 N.W.2d at 915. See also Tobin v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 174
Mich. App. 516, 436 N.W.2d 402 (1988) (facial injuries resulting from one punch were
barred from liability coverage); Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 601, 529 P.2d
1195 (1975) (coverage denied for insured who punched victim once in his face, crushing
his right cheekbone; policy language was slightly different but was interpreted as requiring
an intended injury); CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 666 S.W.2d 689 (1984)
("test is what a plain ordinary person would expect and intend to result from [his deliberate
act]"); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983).
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal also adopted this approach in Terito v.
McAndrew, 246 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971). The insured knocked the plaintiff
off of a bar stool and fell on top of him. The plaintiff suffered an injury to his knee
and ankle. In denying coverage, the court stated: "all direct and natural consequences
flowing [from an intentional act] ... are considered ... intended by the actor." 246
So. 2d at 239. The first circuit did not mention Terito in its unpublished Breland opinion.
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jurisdictions because it does not necessarily require an intent by the
insured to do some injury. If the injury or damage is the natural or
probable consequence of the insured's intentional act, then coverage may
be barred even though the insured had no intent to do any injury. Such
was the case in Argonaut Southwest Insurance Company v. Maupin63
where the insured purchased soil from an individual whom he believed
owned the land, only to discover later that the "seller" was merely a
tenant. Unaware of the mistake, the insured removed the soil and was
subsequently sued by the true landowner. The Texas Supreme Court
denied liability coverage, stating, "[tihe respondent's acts were voluntary
and intentional, even though the result or injury may have been un-
expected, unforeseen and unintended."64 Generally, however, courts using
this approach have applied it in instances where an intent to do some
injury is obvious, as in Rademacher. Argonaut is the only example
found where a court denied coverage without first requiring an intent
to do some injury.
The third approach contains qualities present in both of the above
approaches and appears to be the one adopted in Breland. It generally
adopts a rule stating that recovery is barred only if the resulting injury
is of the same general type as the injury intended. Breland repeatedly
cited United Services Automobile Association v. Elitzky" in which the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania adopted this approach. The plaintiff
was suing for malicious and defamatory statements made by the insured,
Elitzky. The petition also sought recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional injury. The trial court concluded that, given the allegations,
the insured did not have a duty to provide a defense. The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania stated that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause
of action which may have been covered by Elitzky's insurance policy,
because the intentional injury provision excluded only injury and damage
of the same general type which the insured intended to cause.6
Elitzky's willingness to provide coverage for injuries "not of the
same general type intended" is comparable to Breland's allowance of
coverage for injuries "substantially more severe" than those intended.
However, Breland distinguishes itself through the court's application of
the rule, which results in a much more narrow construction of the
exclusion. An example of what the Pennsylvania courts consider an
injury "not of the same general type" ("substantially more severe")
63. 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973) (court was construing policy term of "accident").
64. Id. at 635.
65. 358 Pa. Super. 362, 517 A.2d 982 (1986).
66. Id. at 375, 517 A.2d at 989. See also, MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124
N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984).
[Vol. 52
NOTES
appears in Eisenman v. Hornberger and illustrates the vast difference
between the resulting injury and the intended injury envisioned by the
respective courts when applying the rule. In Eisenman, a burglar broke
into the Eisenman's home in an attempt to steal some liquor. The
burglar illuminated his path through the house by lighting matches,
dropping each to the floor after it burned. One match landed on a
chair and, after smoldering for several hours, ultimately resulted in a
fire which completely destroyed the house. In interpreting the Eisenman
decision, the Elitzky court stated that the Eisenman court allowed liability
coverage because the resulting damage (total destruction of the house)
was not of the same general type as the damage intended (stealing some
liquor).6
The Pennsylvania courts were presented with facts somewhat similar
to Breland in Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Ferrara. 69 The
defendant Ferrara kicked the plaintiff police officer Dobinick in the
groin area as he was attempting to arrest her. About forty-five minutes
later, she kicked the plaintiff a second time in the groin area. As a
result, the plaintiff suffered blood in his urine, ecchymosis of the right
thigh, left knee, and right testicle, epididymitis, and groin contusions,
all of which resulted in acute and chronic epididymitis requiring removal
of his right testicle.70 The trial court denied the insurer's motion for
summary judgment, but the court of appeal reversed, stating, "Ferrara
acting knowing the consequences of her act would be damage to [officer
Dobinick's] genitalia, and this would be substantially certain to result
from her act."'7 The Pennsylvania court, however, did not try to define
the actor's intent as precisely as did the court in Breland. It merely
stated that she had an intent to do "damage" to the officer's groin.
An additional distinction between the Louisiana courts' approach
and that of the other states is the willingness of the other jurisdictions
to infer or presume the necessary intent given an act of an aggressive
nature such as the one in Breland.
Minnesota, like Pennsylvania, has rejected the presumption that one
always intends the natural or probable consequences of his intentional
act .7 However, in Farmers Insurance Group v. Hastings,71 such an
67. 438 Pa. 46, 264 A.2d 673 (1970). The Elitzky 'court cited Eisenman as aligning
Pennsylvania with the jurisdictions which hold the exclusion applicable if the insured
intended to cause harm of the same general type as that which resulted. 358 Pa. Super.
at 372, 517 A.2d at 987.
68. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. at 373, 517 A.2d at 988.
69. 380 Pa. Super. 588, 552 A.2d 699 (1989).
70. Id. at 594, 552 A.2d at 701.
71. Id. at 595, 552 A.2d at 702.
72. See Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 244 N.W.2d 121 (1976).
73. 366 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1985).
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inference was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court based on the
facts of the case. The insured, Kenyon, struck the plaintiff Hastings
with a fist once in the eye, causing a permanent injury. The insured
testified that he was not sure whether he was even trying to hit the
plaintiff. The trial court denied liability coverage. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court affirmed this holding and cited the trial court's reasons
approvingly which stated that the "intent to injure may be inferred
from the character of the act . . . . "14
At a time when Florida adhered to a similar "subjective intentions"
approach to the exclusion, its court of appeal in Zordan v. Page"
recognized that this intent could be presumed where a person strikes
another person in the eye with his fist, causing a fracture of the eye.' 6
The common thread among these cases is that the jurisdictions which
adhere to "subjective intent" standards do not reject per se the inten-
tional tort presumption of inference, i.e. that one intends the natural
or probable consequences of his intentional act. This inference or pre-
sumption becomes relevant when the insured engages in a sufficiently
aggressive act. As recognized by the Elitzky court, "the legal presump-
tions of tort law are relevant ... if they reflect [the insured's] intent. '"7
The mere fact that these presumptions or inferences exist in tort law
does not make them inapplicable in determining an insured's intent
under a contractual provision. Presumptions or inferences do not create
intent but are merely efficient methods of recognizing it when the facts
indicate that no other conclusion is tenable. In many instances it is
simply impossible to prove the actor's intent by any means other than
by inferring this intent from his actions., Reliance on the insured's
testimony is not always an accurate method of determining this intent.
The Elitzky court agreed and stated:
An insured would be entitled to coverage unless he admitted
that he intended the precise injury which occurred. We hope it
is not too jaundiced a view of human nature to express doubt
that such testimony would be forthcoming. 8
This overview of approaches taken by other jurisdictions demon-
strates that the rule adopted by the Breland court is the most funda-
74. Id. at 294.
75. 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied. 508 So. 2d 15 (1987).
As noted earlier in supra note 56, Florida has since wholly abandoned any requirement
of an intent to do harm and requires only an intentional act. See Landis v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989) (rejecting Zordan's requirement of a subjective intent).
76. Zordan at 611. The court was referring to an earlier decision, Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
77. United States Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 370, 517 A.2d 982,
986 (1986).
78. Id. at 373, 517 A.2d at 988.
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mentally sound of the three approaches commonly used. However, a
review of the application of the rule by jurisdictions adhering to rules
similar to that of Breland reveals that the Breland court's application
is by far the most narrow construction ever given the exclusion language.
The rules of contractual interpretation justify narrow constructions
of exclusions to insurance coverage, although perhaps not to the extent
present in Breland. Life and health insurance policies also contain similar
provisions, which have likewise been narrowly construed by the courts.
However, a broad interpretation has been given to similar language
found in the worker's compensation exception to its exclusive remedy
rule. The fields of liability insurance, personal insurance, and worker's
compensation all incorporate provisions which focus on the actor's "in-
tent." Each can be better understood through a discussion of how the
jurisprudential treatment of one compares with and affects the others
in light of the Breland decision.
IV. PRESENT JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETING PERSONAL INSURANCE
EXCLUSION AND WORKER'S COMPENSATION EXCEPTION AND COMPARISON
WITH Breland
A. Personal Insurance
For the purposes of this article, the term "personal insurance" refers
to life, accident, and health insurance. Intent is important in this area
in determining whether a death was "accidental" or a "suicide," or
whether a death or injury was "intentionally inflicted."
The typical life or accident insurance policy allows for recovery
when the insured dies "accidentally." The provision usually reads as
follows:
The company will pay ... upon proof that the death resulted
from bodily injury affected solely through external, violent and
accidental means. 79
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Schonberg v. New York Life Insurance
Compan 80 stated that an insured's death is produced by accidental
means, i.e., is unintended by the insured, when the "average man, under
the existing facts, would regard the loss so unforeseen, unexpected, and
extraordinary that he would say it was an accident." 8 This determination
79. S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 260, at 503, in IS
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
80. 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958).
81. Id. at 469, 104 So. 2d at 177. See also 269 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972)
(death found to be unexpected and extraordinary when insured choked on a plum seed,
ruptured his esophagus, and died).
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is made solely from the viewpoint of the insured. Therefore, if the
insured is shot by an intruder, his death is accidental, as it was "un-
foreseen, unexpected, and extraordinary" from his viewpoint. A more
recent case, O'Toole v. New York Life Insurance," impliedly narrowed
the Schonberg rule to allow recovery. The insured died from an injection
of cocaine. The court cited and agreed with the Schonberg rule, and
then stated, "although he intentionally injected himself with cocaine,
he did not intend to cause nor did he anticipate that this injection
would cause his death." 3 Although the insured's death from the use
of cocaine is far from "extraordinary," the federal court still found
the result accidental, apparently requiring intent to cause death, or
anticipation of death, before disallowing indemnity.84
Life and accident policies also usually include an exclusion for suicide
or "self-destruction." A very heavy burden is placed upon the insurer
in proving the applicability of this exclusion, as a presumption exists
against the occurrence of suicide.85 The insurer must prove that the
physical facts surrounding the death exclude with reasonable certainty
any possibility of accident, and that the insured had a motive for taking
his own life sufficient to overcome the presumption against suicide. The
motive must make it reasonably certain that the death was the result
of a "deliberate intention to take one's own life." 6 The difficulty of
overcoming this burden is evidenced by the case of Rome v. Life and
Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. 7 The insured came home
at 5:30 a.m., extremely intoxicated, and took a pistol from beneath his
wife's pillow. As he left the house he shouted, "[tfake care of the
baby." He entered his automobile, drove about 200 feet, and stopped
next to a wooded area. Two shots were then fired. He was found dead
in his car with a bullet hole in his temple. The glove compartment of
the vehicle was open, the engine was running, and the deceased had a
cigarette in his hand. The court held that the suicide exclusion was not
applicable because the physical facts indicated a possibility that the
shooting occurred accidentally while Mr. Rome was trying to place the
pistol in his glove compartment. Additionally, the facts did not indicate
a sufficient motive. Although the insured had been depressed over his
wife's recent filing for separation, the court stated that the rest of the
82. 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 915.
84. See also Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins., 787 P.2d I (Utah 1990) (repeated user's
death from overdose considered accidental although he had previously been warned that
continued use would result in his death).
85. Rome v. Life Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 336 So. 2d 275 (La. App. ist Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 276.
87. Id. at 275.
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evidence showed he was in good health and had no financial problems.$'
When an insured is intentionally injured by a third party, the injury
is considered by the courts to be "accidental." In an effort to avoid
coverage in these instances, life, s9 accident, and health insurance policies
usually contain provisions excluding liability for "death (or injury) re-
sulting from intentional act" or "death caused by injuries intentionally
inflicted." Here the beneficiary need only prove that the death (or injury,
in the case of health insurance) was "accidental," i.e., caused by violent,
external, and unforeseen means. The burden then shifts to the insurer
to prove the applicability of the exclusion by showing that the killing
was intentional and that the actual victim was the intended victim.90
Chambers v. First National Life Insurance Company9l illustrates the
narrow construction given this provision by the courts. The insured,
Jessie Chambers, was sitting in a bar when an individual entered the
bar, drew a gun, and repeatedly shot Chambers in the back. The killer
then left, without ever seeing the victim's face. Because a motive could
not be established, the court held that the insurer had failed to meet
the requirement of proving that Chambers (the actual victim) was in
fact the intended victim. The court appeared to be of the opinion that
since the killer never saw the insured's face, the incident could have
been a case of mistaken identity.Y
88. Id. at 277. See also Young v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 159 So. 2d 395 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1963), where the insured, who had previously exhibited suicidal tendencies,
was alone in a room when a shot was fired. He was found dead from a bullet wound
to the head. Although the gun was always kept with the hammer on an empty cylinder
(greatly reducing the chance of accidental discharge), the court held that the facts presented
a reasonable possibility of accident because the bullet entered Young's head from the left
side and his left arm was crippled. For cases finding the required intent, see Newdigate
v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass'n, 180 La. 761, 158 So. 2d 358 (1936) (insured who had severe
emotional and financial problems and had previously expressed a desire to kill himself
was determined to have drowned himself when he disappeared from a cruise liner); and
Green v. Southern Farm Bureau, 390 So. 2d 977 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (insured
expressed her intentions of killing herself immediately after the incident as well as in the
ambulance and hospital prior to death).
89. In life insurance policies the exclusion usually only precludes recovery of the
double indemnity benefits.
90. Tornabene v. Atlas Life Ins. Co. Inc., 295 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 4th.Cir. 1974).
91. 253 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
92. See also Tornabene, 295 So. 2d .10 (court allowed recovery of life insurance
proceeds of insured, who was found dead in his taxi cab from two bullet holes in the
back of his head, because of insufficient proof to establish an intentional killing or that
insured was intended victim). For another "mistaken identity" case, see Brooks v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 13 La. App. 502, 128 So. 183 (1930) (recovery allowed where insured
was mistaken as a robber and killed). For cases interpreting similar exclusions in health
insurance or accidental injury policies, see Culotta v. Security Ind. Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d
863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (insured not allowed to recover for injuries received when
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In Cummings v. Universal Life Insurance Company," the fourth
circuit modified the test that it had stated just two years earlier in
Chambers. However, the court either failed to recognize the modification
or intended it to be applied only in cases interpreting the specific policy
language before the court. The case involved the death of Henry Cum-
mings from stab wounds administered by William Kelly. There was some
doubt as to whether Kelly intended to kill or only to wound Cummings.
The exclusion read, "[d]eath [benefits] ... will not be payable if ...
[the death is] a result of injuries intentionally inflicted." 94 The provision
in Chambers referred to "[d]eath . . . caused by . .. intentional act."
The court could have simply equated the two provisions and applied
the Chambers rule, but instead proceeded as follows:
While under this policy language it was not necessary for the
insurer to allege or prove that the assailant intended the death
of his victim, but only that he intended the injuries which
resulted in death, . . . our prior jurisprudence has established
• . . that the insurer relying upon an exclusionary clause relating
to intentionally inflicted injuries bears the double burden of
proving not only that the injuring act [as opposed to "the
killing"] was intentional but also that the actual victim was the
intended victim.95
The court then cited Chambers as authority and found the exclusion
applicable, as the injuring act, here the infliction of multiple stab wounds,
was intentional. By requiring that only the "injuring act" be intentional
rather than the "killing" itself, the court greatly lessened the insurer's
burden of proving the applicability of the exclusion. The insurer need
only prove that the insured died from an act intending to injure; it
need not prove that the attacker intended to kill the insured.
Louisiana courts have also refused to allow recovery of life insurance
proceeds when the attacker mistakenly believes his actions are justified
by self-defense. In Mitchell v. State National Life Insurance Company, 96
the beneficiary argued that because the killing was thought to be in
self-defense, the intentional injury exclusion did not apply. The court
found that, no matter how blameless the motive, the girlfriend intended
the injuring act and therefore the exclusion was applicable..
he was shot by a robber); Lombard v. Manchester Life Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 742 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1981) (recovery was allowed for insured who was struck in the face by
one of three gun shots fired into a crowd).
93. 286 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 412-413 (emphasis added).
96. 406 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). See also Hawkins v. Security Indus.
Ins. Co.. 338 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
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In summary, intent is relevant in personal insurance coverage in
three instances: the context of the broad inquiry concerning whether a
death is "accidental," that of the particular inquiry addressing whether
an insured has committed suicide, and that pertaining to the inquiry
involving whether injuries or death fall within an "intentional injury"
or "intentional act" exclusion. A death is considered accidental if a
reasonable man would consider it unforeseen, unexpected, and extraor-
dinary from the insured's viewpoint. Intent to commit suicide is only
proved when the possibility of an accident has been excluded to a
reasonable certainty and the evidence establishes a strong motive for
the victim's taking of his own life. The intentional injury exclusion is
applicable when the insurer proves that the killing of the insured was
either intended or resulted from acts which were intended to inflict
injury but not necessarily death. In addition, the insurer must prove
that the actual victim was the intended victim. The attacker's belief that
he is acting in self-defense does not vitiate his intent.
Questions involving personal insurance coverage involve issues of
contractual interpretation. As such, the accompanying statutory and
jurisprudential rules for interpreting contracts, and the related public
policies, must be considered. However, when the language at issue is
found in a statute, the rules of contractual interpretation are not ap-
plicable and different public policies must be considered. Such is the
case with the exception to the worker's compensation exclusive remedy
rule.
B. Worker's Compensation
If an employee is injured as the result of an intentional act by a
co-employee or his employer, the Worker's Compensation Act9" allows
him to pursue traditional remedies outside of the Act. The precise
language of the statute states:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the liability of the employer,
or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of
such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other
statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an in-
tentional act."
In Bazely v. Tortorich," the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the legislative intent behind the words "intentional act."
The legislative history indicated that the legislature's purpose was to
impose a sanction against employers or co-employees for intentional
97. La. R.S. 23:1031-1379 (1985).
98. La. R.S. 23:1032.B (Supp. 1990).
99. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
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wrongs by allowing the injured employee a delictual remedy. After
considering this history, the court stated, "[iun drawing a line between
intentional and unintentional acts, we believe the legislative aim was to
make use of the well established division between intentional torts and
negligence in common law."'10 The court then stated that, for an act
to be intentional, the actor must "consciously desire the physical result
of his act ... or know that the result is substantially certain to follow
from his conduct ...."101 Therefore, in Bazely, the co-employee's "vol-
untary act" of not blowing the truck's horn to warn plaintiff of an
approaching vehicle was not an intentional act as plaintiff had argued,
because the defendant did not intend (consciously desire or know to a
substantial certainty) that the plaintiff would suffer harm as a result of
that act. As explained by the court, "intent has reference to the con-
sequences of an act rather than to the act itself."'0 The court also
settled conflicting lines of jurisprudence by concluding that the two
prongs need not be proven in the conjunctive; a finding of "consciously
desiring" or "knowing to a substantial certainty" would be sufficient
to prove intent.
The purpose for the "know to a substantial certainty" definition
of intent and its distinction from the "consciously desire" basis is very
clearly explained by Prosser through the "bomb in the carriage" scenario:
An anarchist who throws a bomb into the royal carriage may
actually wish to kill no one but the king; but since he knows
that the death of the others in the carriage is a necessary and
almost inevitable incident to that end, and nevertheless goes
ahead with the deed, it must be said that he intends to kill
them.'03
This definition does not present an objective or "reasonable man"
criterion for determining intent. Plaintiffs would argue that an employer
"should have known" that certain acts %;ould result in harm to the
employees. However, in Fallo v. Tuboscope Inspection,"O4 the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that such objective reasoning was clear error.
Fallo involved a co-employee who was operating a conveyor belt. Be-
lieving plaintiff Fallo to be in danger, the co-employee left his post to
go to Fallo's aid. However, as a result of the co-employee's leaving his
post, the conveyer belt continued to run and rolled a pipe over Fallo's
leg. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's summary judgment
for the defendant, stating that the defendant possibly "should have
100. Id. at 480.
101. Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. W. Prosser, supra note 41. at 31-32.
104. 444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
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known" that the injury would occur.1os The supreme court reversed and
stated the Bazely rule, which requires that the defendant "know," or
"should have known," to a substantial certainty that the harmful con-
sequences would occur. Thus, a summary judgment was proper because
it would be illogical to conclude that the co-employee went to the aid
of Fallo while being substantially certain that doing so would result in
Fallo's being crushed by a pipe.
"Substantially certain" merely prescribes the known degree of like-
lihood or chance of the occurrence of the result. Prosser states that
mere knowledge or appreciation of a risk is not sufficient. In Hood v.
South Louisiana Medical Center,' °6 the court of appeal stated that the
actor "must have known that the injury ... was inevitable."''
Although not emphasized in Bazely, the "result" which must be
consciously desired or known to a substantial certainty refers to the
requirements of the particular intentional tort alleged. For instance, in
a battery, a contact which is harmful or offensive, not the injury, is
the "physical result," which must be intended. The case of Caudle v.
Betts'08 is an excellent illustration of the importance of distinguishing
what physical results must be intended.
In Caudle, several employees at a Christmas party were jokingly
administering a slight shock to one another with an electric automobile
condenser. The company's president, Betts, shocked Caudle by applying
the condenser to the back of his neck. Caudle developed severe nerve
damage which required surgery and later resulted in numbness of the
right side of his head.
The lower courts concluded that the employer intentionally shocked
the employee Caudle without his consent but, because the severe injury
was neither foreseeable nor intentional, no intentional tort had occurred.
The supreme court concluded that by administering a shock to Caudle's
neck, Betts intended a harmful or offensive contact, and therefore had
committed a battery, entitling Caudle to a civil remedy. Betts' liability
was then defined to include unforeseen and fortuitously more severe
injuries based on the rationale that such losses should fall upon the
wrongdoer rather than the innocent victim.20
In summary, the worker's compensation "intentional act" exception
to the exclusive remedy rule adheres to traditional tort principles for
determining when recovery is available outside of the Act. The "con-
105, Fallo v. Tuboscope Inspection, 435 So. 2d 1033 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
106. 517 So. 2d 659 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 671.
108. 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987).
109. Id. at 392. See also Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La.
1988) ("clear tendency to give greater causal effect to an intentional fault .... "); W.
Prosser, supra note 41.
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sequences" required of the particular intentional tort alleged must be
either "consciously desired" or "known to a substantial certainty" for
an intentional tort to occur. For the second definition to be applicable,
the actor must have "known" to a substantial certainty that such con-
sequences would occur.
As the reader has probably observed, many issues are present in
litigation concerning personal insurance and worker's compensation which
are closely related to the issues presented by the intentional injury
exclusion in liability insurance found in Breland. A comparison of the
jurisprudence pertaining to personal insurance and worker's compen-
sation with the Breland opinion fosters a better understanding of the
policy behind each and the effect of Breland upon these other areas of
the law.
C. Comparison and Effect
Personal and liability insurance both involve contractual interpre-
tation and similar public policies and thus are very analogous. For
instance, the "mistaken identity" assertion is recognized in both areas." 0
When discussing the similarities and possible effects of the jurisprudential
exclusions found in personal and liability insurance, one should keep
in mind the purpose of each type of insurance. Personal insurance
indemnifies the insured for injuries which he has received, while liability
insurance indemnifies the insured for liability resulting out of injuries
inflicted upon another.
Schonberg's requirement that the death be unforeseen, unexpected,
and extraordinary before recovery is allowed under a life or accident
110. For personal insurance, see Brooks v. Continental Cas. Co., 13 La. App. 502,
128 So. 183 (1930); for liability insurance, see Sabri v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Co., 488 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff was allowed to recover from
liability policy of insured where insured shot her in the mistaken belief that she was a
burglar).
Interestingly, Mitchell's, 406 So. 2d at 777, refusal to allow a motive of self-defense
to vitiate intent in the personal insurance field has not been completely embraced in the
area of liability insurance. In Brasseaux v. Girouard, 269 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972), the third circuit on rehearing refused to allow the insured's mistaken belief that
his actions were justified by self-defense to preclude application of the exclusion and
coverage was barred. However, in Langlois v. Eschet, 378 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979). Judge Lemmon for the fourth circuit stated in reversing a summary judgment that
an insured who in good faith believed (albeit unreasonably) that the use of force was
necessary "might be said to have not intended the injury .. . in which case the insurance
policy might be held to provide coverage . I..." Id. at 191. See also Johnson v. Hitchens.
518 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (citing approvingly the above quoted language).
But see Coleman ex rel. Mathews v. Moore. 426 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 433 So. 2d 149 (1982) (court refused to allow coverage but did not directly address
issue of self-defense).
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insurance policy is arguably too stringent a requirement. This is evidenced
by O'Toole's impliedly narrowing this rule and requiring that the insured
actually have an intent to cause death or an anticipation of death. Under
O'Toole, death need not be unforeseen, only unintended. At issue in
these instances, as in Breland, is the intent of the insured. If the insured
did not intend his death, then his death should be considered "acci-
dental." In determining what injuries or death were "intended" in the
context of a life or health insurance policy, the Breland rule should
govern by analogy.
For example, Joe is an insured under a health insurance policy which
excludes coverage for self-inflicted injuries. He becomes angry at work
one day and slams his fist down on his desk. The wooden desk cracks
and splinters, causing severe lacerations to Joe's hand and wrist. The
tendons and arteries are so severely damaged that surgery is required
to regain full use of the hand. By slamming his fist into his desk, Joe
did intend some trauma to his hand. However, the injury intended was
nominal compared to the injury which resulted. Under a reasonable
layman's interpretation, the more severe resulting injury (complications
involving nerves and tendons) would not be excluded from coverage
under the health insurance policy. Under the same reasoning, however,
such injuries of the above nature should be excluded if they were the
result of an insured punching through a glass window. Under these
different circumstances, an insured should be substantially certain that
severe injuries-injuries of the nature resulting-would occur.
The intentional injury exclusion found in personal insurance policies
should be construed more narrowly than its counterpart in liability
insurance policies for the reason that, in the personal insurance context,
the intentional acts are not being performed by the insured but by a
third party. The insured is not trying to consciously control the risk
insured against. In addition, the public policy of not indemnifying one
for liability resulting from his own wrongful acts is not present in
situations involving personal insurance. However, a broad interpretation
of Cummings runs contrary to this suggestion, for there the court did
not require that the death be intended but merely that it result from
an act which was intended to injure. A better approach would have
been to adopt a rule similar to Breland's. If the assailant intended only
minor injuries but death resulted, then the beneficiaries should be entitled
to the life insurance proceeds. However, if the assailant intended severe
injuries and death resulted, then the exclusion should apply. As in
Breland, this rule would conform with a reasonable insurance purchaser's
interpretation.
Because personal insurance policies are also contracts, the reasoning
of Breland can be applied analogously in many instances. However, the
worker's compensation provision exists in the form of a statute. The
broad interpretation given to this exception by the courts greatly benefits
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the victim as it allows him to seek a more lucrative traditional civil
remedy. However, concern for the victim is not the sole basis for this
broad interpretation. This exception is statutory and is accompanied by
legislative history which indicates that it was to be applied in instances
involving intentional torts by a co-employee or employer. An employer
is held liable for unintentional injuries, as in Caudle, because public
policy dictates that these losses should be borne by the wrongdoer rather
than the innocent victim.
For these reasons an employer or co-employer is held liable for
fortuitously occurring, more severe injuries resulting from his intentional
tort. These same injuries, however, might not be excluded from his
liability coverage because of the rules of contractual interpretation and
different public policies. Thus under today's guidelines, Caudle could
collect for his nerve injuries from Betts' liability insurer.
The dicta in Breland stating that intentional tort theory uses an
objective inquiry would-if it were not dicta-effectively overrule Fallo.
An objective inquiry would re-open the door to arguments that a co-
employer or employer "should have known" that the plaintiff would
suffer injuries as a result of his act. Thus, Fallo would be decided
differently today, if Breland's dicta were followed, as the co-employee
defendant should have known that Fallo would suffer injuries as a result
of leaving his post.
Although Breland is final, it is-at least in theory-limited to the
particular wording of the provision at issue. Because the policy is a
contract, the insurer can attempt to circumvent the decision by properly
rewriting the provision. Some suggestions may prove helpful.
V. MODMCArlONS WHICH MIOHT BETTER SERVE THE INSURER'S
PuRPosE
When reviewing how effective alternatively worded provisions would
prove in excluding liability coverage in instances such as Breland, the
objective which must be achieved should be kept in mind. The objective
is twofold: first, the exclusion must by its language exclude coverage
for the injuries at issue; secondly, a reasonable insurance purchaser must
be able to interpret the provision as excluding such injuries.
The best modifications to the standard intentional act exclusion in
liability policies would appear to be those suggested or tested by the
courts. The Breland court emphasized that the insurer might prove more
successful if it used language similar to that found in the worker's
compensation statute, which excludes injuries resulting from an "inten-
tional act." Indeed, some current liability insurance policies do use such
phraseology."'
il. See Doe v. Smith. 573 So. 2d 238 (La. App. ist Cir. 1990); Barton v. Allstate
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However, such a revision will probably not prove successful for
several reasons. One should remember that the words "intentional act"
in the worker's compensation statute are in statutory form. Fortuitously
more severe injuries in worker's compensation cases were included within
the exception not because of the presence of the words "intentional
act" but because these words were equated with "intentional tort" due
to the statute's legislative history. Left unqualified, the phrase "inten-
tional act" is incomplete and begs the question of what must be intended
for an insured's act to qualify as an "intentional" one. An act is only
"intentional" if the results produced by the act were consciously desired
or known to a substantial certainty to follow from it. The confusion
usually arises out of a belief that by labeling an act an "intentional
act," one has added an air of malice to an otherwise merely "voluntary"
act. By failing to state what must be intended for a voluntary act to
be an "intentional act" within the exclusion, the language poses the
same dilemma to the courts as did the worker's compensation exception.
The legislative history clarified the exception by equating the words
"intentional act" with "intentional tort," thus answering the question
of what must be intended. The insurance provision cannot be clarified
in the same manner. Thus, in an exclusion which reads "injuries resulting
from an intentional act," the only logical "result" on which the court
should focus is the injury suffered by the victim. If the injury was not
intended, then it did not result from an intentional act. Thus the insurer
is faced with the same burden of proof. The revision might also prove
ineffective because it may not change a reasonable insurance purchaser's
interpretation of the exclusion. The exclusion would still refer to "in-
juries" and "intent." Confronted with sufficient facts, the court on
another day could rule that such language is ambiguous and proceed
under the same rationale as it did in deciding Breland.
Also, the Breland court seems to have forgotten that it equated
"intentional injuries" with "injuries resulting from an intentional act"
in Pique."2 A more accurate and perhaps better version of this alternative
would exclude "injuries resulting from an act intended to injure." This
Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 157 (1988). The
provisions exclude "bodily injury which may reasonably be expected to result from an
intentional act." Note that the exclusion contractually provides for the objective or
reasonable man standard for the resulting injury, but nonetheless requires an "intentional
act," which requires a determination of the insured's state of mind.
112. Pique v. Saia, 450 So. 2d 654, 655 (La. 1984). In Pique the supreme court stated,
"[a]n injury is intentional, i.e. the product of an intentional act, only when ......
Interestingly, in Breland the court stated that a jury charge was arguably more favorable
to the insurer than was required. The charge the court referred to was the above excerpt
from the Pique opinion. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. 1989).
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wording states what must be intended-merely an injury, not necessarily
the resulting injury.
Another alternative is to modify the exclusion to preclude coverage
for injuries resulting from intentional tort, i.e., battery, assault, etc.
Such a change would truly mirror the language of the worker's com-
pensation statute, as that statute is interpreted in this manner. Such
wording has proven successful in Louisiana courts;' however, the cases
do not present facts such as those in Breland which would sufficiently
test the provision.
The most obvious problem with this wording is the reasonable
layman's interpretation of it. More than a few freshman law students
have spent weeks trying to comprehend these terms only to have the
exam remind them of how little they actually knew. Surely a court
would not expect more from a reasonable insurance purchaser after only
a cursory reading of the provision. Undoubtedly, a court would find
the terms ambiguous.
Another version of the exclusion provides that coverage will not be
afforded for "bodily injury or property damage intentionally caused by
an insured.'14 However, other jurisdictions have held that the wording
is ambiguous and have required the insurer to prove that the insured
intended the injury,"' thus posing the same burden as the Breland
exclusion. One Louisiana court of appeal decision declared the wording
of this alternative "vague and uncertain; ' 6 however, another decision
found the language "clear and unambiguous.""' 7 Although technical legal
definitions of "causation" would not .be useful, the wording may still
convey a broader meaning to this version than that found in Breland.
A reasonable insurance purchaser could possibly realize that he need
only "cause" the injury rather than actually "intend" it. Obviously a
reasonable insurance purchaser's concept of cause would be much nar-
rower than that recognized in tort law; however, injuries of the nature
occurring in Breland might possibly be excluded nonetheless.
113. See Duplechain v. Turner, 444 So. 2d 1322 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
448 So. 2d 114 (1984); Vascocu v. Singletary, 434 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983);
Clerk v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 203 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), writ refused,
251 La. 733, 206 So. 2d 90 (1968).
114. See Johnson v. Hitchens, 518 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Blanchard, 431 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Nettles v. Evans, 303
So. 2d 306 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974) (holding that intoxication could preclude necessary
intent); Brasseaux v. Girouard, 269 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), writ denied, 271
So. 2d 262 (1973).
115. See Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980); Grinnel
Mut. Reins. Co. v. Frierdich, 79 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 399 N.E.2d 252 (I1. App. 5th Dist.
1979).
116. Brasseaux, 269 So. 2d at 595.
117. Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964) (interpreting an automobile liability insurance policy).
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In Lamkin v. Brooks,"'1 the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted
an intentional injury exclusion which may offer the most effective word-
ing. The exclusion applied to "claims ... arising out of the willful,
intentional or malicious conduct of any Insured."" 9 The most attractive
aspect of this wording is that the Lamkin court held that it precluded
recovery from injuries of the exact nature as those in Breland. The
facts involved a police officer who punched the plaintiff one time in
the face. The blow broke several bones, and the plaintiff required surgery
and hospitalization. The court concluded that the officer's conduct clearly
fell within the exclusion. Arguably, Breland' overruled the result in
Lamkin. However, the Breland court repeatedly emphasized that its
opinion was based on the proper interpretation which should be given
to the language of the particular exclusion at issue. The Lamkin exclusion
uses much broader language as it excludes not just "intended injuries"
but "claims ... arising out of intentional or malicious conduct." This
broader language should indicate to a reasonable insurance purchaser
that he is not afforded liability coverage for any responsibility resulting
from his aggressive acts. Perhaps the only problem with this exclusion
is its use of the incomplete phrase "intentional conduct." It does not
state what must in fact be intended. The courts may use this ambiguity
to interpret the clause as excluding claims arising out of injuries intended
by the insured. This result could be avoided by simply modifying the
provision to exclude claims arising out of acts intended to injure.
In summary, the best alternatives for modifying the policy language
focus on liability which results from an act by the insured which is
intended to injure. The insurer is not required to prove the insured's
intent to inflict the resulting injury or any similar injury for the provision
to take effect.
V. CONCLUSION
The facts of Breland allowed the Louisiana Supreme Court to for-
mulate an approach to be used prospectively in determining the scope
of the standard exclusion from liability coverage for "injuries expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured." The court adopted a
two part rule. The first step requires determination of what injury the
actor subjectively intended. The second step involves a reasonable lay-
man's interpretation of the exclusion. If the resulting injury is so much
more severe than the injury intended that a reasonable insurance pur-
chaser would consider it as not "intended," then the resulting injury
is not excluded from the insurer's liability coverage. The second step is
118. 498 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1986).
119. Id. at 1071.
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basically a comparison-through a reasonable insurance purchaser's eyes-
of the resulting injury and the injury determined in step one to have
been intended. The decision aligns Louisiana with other jurisdictions
which interpret the exclusion as requiring more than a mere intent to
injure to exclude coverage. However, Breland's application of the rule
is unprecedented and leads to an extremely narrow interpretation of the
exclusion. The decision is not confined to liability insurance issues but
can be used effectively by analogy in other areas such as life and health
insurance.
The application of the rule in Breland requires either that the court
reconsider its position or that the insurer rewrite the exclusion if the
purpose behind the provision is to be achieved. Until one or the other
is done, it would seem that in Louisiana, an insured can act wrongfully
and know that he will not have to "pay the piper" for the resulting
damages.
Leland Redding Gallaspy
